 Allende
Erred
What caused
Allende’s downfall? The major factor, I argued in this 1973
article, was the revolt of the middle class.
There are two ways of changing
the world: by imposing your will on others, or by persuading them
that your course of action is the correct one. Salvador Allende
Gossens firmly rejected the former, but he did not take up the latter.
The latter is the essence of the democratic process. But it is a
long one. To govern a democratic society, one must have the consent
of most of the people most of the time. Even if your political opponents
are in power, in supporting the democratic process you support the
fact that they are there.
When he became president of Chile, Allende had the support of most
of the people — not their personal support, but their support
in his right to be president. Chileans had faith in their democratic
system, proof of which is provided by the very fact of Allende’s
election.
In the presidential elections, Allende achieved 36.3 percent of
the vote. He was the frontrunning candidate, but did not have an
absolute majority. Under Chile’s constitution (now obsolete),
when no candidate had an absolute majority of votes cast, congress
decided between them. And although congress could pick any candidate,
the tradition was that congress would pick the leading candidate.
In an act of faith in the democratic system, congress acted out
of tradition and chose Allende.
Once in power, though, Allende seemed to forget that he was a minority
president, and moved too fast for the majority of Chileans. In ruling
as though he had a mandate for his policies, he ended up polarising
Chilean opinion.
If his policies had worked, the results may have been different.
But they didn’t — they were disastrous for the Chilean
economy. Most significantly, however, is that the major factors
were internal rather than external.
There are two important factors which were external in nature and
which had negative effects on Chile’s economy. The price of
copper, Chile’s main export, fell drastically while Allende
was in power; and the US made it difficult (if not impossible) for
Chile to gain credit internationally. Foreign investment capital
also dried up.
Chile’s economy is dependent on the rest of the world: it
exports copper (and little else) and imports food, equipment and
spare parts. As a result of the nationalisation of the copper mines,
copper production fell; as a result of agrarian reforms, domestic
food production fell. Thus Chile had less to sell on the world market
— at lower prices — and had to buy more. This foreign
exchange squeeze also made importation of spare parts difficult,
one of the complaints of the truckers, resulting in a black market
for US dollars.
Although Chile’s economy is dependent on the rest of the world,
the rest of the world cannot be blamed for Chile’s economic
plight. If copper and food production had remained constant, Chile
could have survived, fairly easily, the withdrawal of international
credit and capital, despite the falling copper prices. It is certainly
true that the American companies had been particularly lax in training
Chilean nationals to managerial positions in the mines. The result
was that the nationalisation of the mines left the Chileans incapable
of running them efficiently: politicisation of the mines put non-economic
factors to the fore.
Nationalisation per se is no panacea. With a slower course of action,
it is conceivable that Allende could have persuaded the Americans
to phase themselves out. After all, in the Middle East, the Americans
don’t seem to mind nationalisation too much.
But it is unlikely that Allende could have moved more slowly —
even had he wanted to. As the leader of a coalition, rather than
a unified party, he was at the mercy of extremist factions. For
those of his supporters who were on his left, Allende was moving
too slowly as it was. Many of his supporters wanted to implement
their Marxist program without regard for the democratic process.
To them, the opposition which Allende’s policies brought proved
that Allende had to disregard opposition and ride roughshod over
his opponents.
Allende was between two stools: committed to the democratic process,
he wanted to convince the populace that his course was the right
one, but the very same democratic process meant that he leant on
the support given him by the extremist factions of his coalition.
Many of Allende’s supporters felt that Allende’s presidency
gave them a mandate to violence. Since Allende required their support,
he was unable to restrain them. He was the man in the middle, in
a vicious circle. On the one hand, congress, controlled by his opponents,
blocked his path; on the other, his increasing dependence on the
more radical members of his coalition increasingly aggravated his
opponents.
As the process continued, and his policies began to bite, Chile
became polarised more and more into pro and anti Allende camps,
and the middle class began to protest.
Allende was not brought down by the rich. The rich man can survive
any Marxist revolution — barring outright expropriation. As
long as any vestige of political freedom remains, they can emigrate
to Switzerland or wherever and live on their Swiss bank accounts.
Not so the middle class.
It was the middle class which bore the brunt of Allende’s
policies. Rising food prices brought housewives out on the streets
in their thousands. They were not the poor housewives, who were
probably eating better than they had before. The poor had received
higher wages, and special assistance — they had received the
benefits of Allende’s reign. These are, no doubt, the reasons
behind Allende’s increased popularity at the congressional
elections — from 36 percent to 44 percent.
The middle class was squeezed by inflation, by rising prices, by
the shortages of meat and other foodstuffs. (The rich, of course,
weren’t too happy — but then, they were rich.)
In a reversal of the normal situation, the middle class, led by
the truckers, went on strike. The main grievance of the truckers
was the increase in state controls, together with the threat of
government competition and the increasing difficulties in getting
spare parts.
When the truckers went on strike, Allende made his most serious
mistake. He announced a state of emergency, which was followed by
wholesale arrests. Protesting housewives were dispersed with tear
gas, while a massive demonstration of his supporters gained his
sanction — and gave him a psychological lift.
His actions further polarised Chile. The professional workers went
on strike. He could still have placated them, compromised. But he
was in the middle. In an invidious situation, and any move towards
a compromise could have lost some support. Or, worse still, have
turned some of the extremists against him.
In a democracy, when most of the people oppose you most of the time,
it is very difficult to rule. This was Allende’s contradiction:
in any society, a majority of the population will oppose significant
change; in a democracy, people will make their opinions known and
act upon them if sufficiently provoked. But when a democracy is
polarised, as was Chile, it is only a small step to civil war.
Even so, it is conceivable that democracy could have reasserted
itself, but the result of the coup is that democracy in Chile is
dead, the saddest thing of all. There have been some sickening attempts
(by The Canberra Times and News-Weekly in particular)
to justify the coup on the basis that 63.7 percent of the people
didn’t vote for Allende. Allende was constitutionally elected,
and the only way he could be removed legally was by constitutional
means.
Allende’s powers of persuasion were legendary: the coup leaders
arranged that Allende’s calls would be routed to a central
office to ensure that he could woo none of the coup leaders away
from their cause. That was how afraid they were of his voice! With
this power, set on a slightly more conciliatory course, it is possible
that he could have quietened his extremist supporters, and won some
of his opponents. But he was doomed to failure as long as he did
not realise that, in a democracy, a ballot box revolution is not
possible wholesale.
Copyright
© 1973 by Mark Tier |
